Learning Hub

How the sanctions regimes work

Five regimes — the UN apex, then the EU, the UK, Switzerland and the United States — read side by side across the eight things that actually determine an answer. Every statement is cited to the instrument that creates it, on the official publisher's own site.

Structure as at 2026-08-24Re-verified quarterly against the official texts

This explains how the five regimes are constructed and where they diverge. It is not legal advice, it states no view on whether any particular party or transaction is caught, and it deliberately contains no statement of who is designated today — list state changes weekly and belongs at the official sources cited throughout.

1 · Walk through

One payment, four regimes

Ten minutes. A single hypothetical payment, tested against every regime at once. Scroll, and the panel relights as the four answers come apart — over reach, over a 70% shareholding, over who may license it, and over what happens if it goes wrong.

Start scrolling →

2 · Practise

Designation cases, worked

Real judgments from the UK and EU courts, three a day with model answers — read for what each actually decides, and for the ways a careless citation overstates it. Two of them turn on a check most people skip.

Start the exercises →

The five regimes, and who runs each

Four of these bind private parties. One does not — and understanding why is the key to the whole subject.

United Nations

UN Security Council, through its Sanctions Committees

The apex layer. The Security Council designates; it does not enforce against private parties. Every UN measure reaches a bank or a company only once a member state has implemented it in its own law — which is why the four regimes below exist at all.

Charter of the United Nations The lawChapter VII, Art. 41 — measures not involving the use of armed force
UN Security Council Consolidated List Finding aid — not the lawCompiled from the individual Committees' lists

European Union

The Council of the EU designates; national competent authorities enforce

Two instruments, always in that order: a CFSP Decision agreed unanimously, then a Regulation that makes it directly binding on private parties. There is no EU-level OFSI — licensing and enforcement sit with each member state's own competent authority.

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union The lawArt. 215 TFEU — restrictive measures, following a CFSP Decision under Art. 29 TEU
EU Sanctions Map Finding aid — not the lawInformational only — the legal act is the Official Journal text

United Kingdom

FCDO designates; OFSI (HM Treasury) administers financial sanctions

Post-Brexit the UK runs an autonomous regime under its own framework Act, with a country or thematic statutory instrument for each regime. OFSI is the single financial-sanctions authority — licensing, reporting and civil enforcement in one body, which is the sharpest institutional contrast with the EU.

Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 The lawSAMLA 2018 — the framework Act; regimes are made by regulations under it
The UK Sanctions List (UKSL), published by the FCDO Finding aid — not the lawSingle list since 28 January 2026, when OFSI's Consolidated List of Asset Freeze Targets closed. Administrative compilation — the legal act is the statutory instrument

Switzerland

The Federal Council enacts ordinances; SECO administers

Switzerland is not an EU member and is bound by no EU act. It implements UN measures as a UN member, and adopts EU packages by an autonomous decision of the Federal Council each time — which can mean a lag, and can mean differences.

Embargo Act (Federal Act on the Implementation of International Sanctions) The lawSR 946.231, of 22 March 2002 — Art. 1–2 empower the Federal Council to enact sanctions ordinances
SECO — sanctions and embargoes (SESAM search) Finding aid — not the lawSearch tool — the legal act is the ordinance in the Classified Compilation

United States

The President acts by Executive Order; OFAC (Treasury) administers

The widest reach of the five, by design. A national-emergency statute delegates broad power to the President; OFAC writes the regulations, runs the lists, issues the licences and imposes the civil penalties. Reach extends past US persons through dollar clearing and, separately, through secondary sanctions on non-US parties.

International Emergency Economic Powers Act (U.S. Code, GPO) The lawIEEPA, 50 U.S.C. ch. 35 — with the National Emergencies Act; programmes are built by Executive Order
OFAC Sanctions List Search (SDN and consolidated non-SDN lists) Finding aid — not the lawSearch tool — the legal act is the Executive Order and 31 C.F.R. ch. V

Eight questions that decide the answer

Ask these in order, of each regime separately. An answer from one is not an answer from another — which is the whole reason this page exists.

01 · Where does the power to designate come from?

Legal base and who designates

Everything downstream follows from the instrument. It sets who can add a name, how fast, what a challenge looks like, and which court hears it. Two of these regimes need a political consensus before anything happens; one needs a single signature.

Security Council resolution under Chapter VII

The Council acts under Article 41 of the Charter and delegates the maintenance of each list to a subsidiary Sanctions Committee. A resolution binds member states, not private parties — the obligation on a bank arises from its own state's implementing law.

Charter of the United Nations The lawChapter VII, Art. 41
Security Council sanctions committees Regulator's guidance

CFSP Decision (unanimity), then a Council Regulation

A Decision under Article 29 TEU sets the policy and requires unanimity in the Council. Where it touches economic relations with third countries, a Regulation under Article 215 TFEU then follows on a joint proposal of the High Representative and the Commission. The Regulation is what binds private parties, directly and without national transposition.

Art. 29 TEU The law
Art. 215 TFEU The law
Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 — a worked example of the pattern The law

SAMLA 2018 framework Act, plus regulations per regime

SAMLA gives an appropriate Minister the power to make sanctions regulations for stated purposes, and each regime — country or thematic — is its own statutory instrument. Designations are made by the Secretary of State (in practice the FCDO); OFSI administers what follows.

Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 The lawSAMLA — Part 1 (power to make sanctions regulations)
The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 — a worked example of the pattern The lawSI 2019/855

Embargo Act, then a Federal Council ordinance per regime

The Embargo Act empowers the Federal Council to enact coercive measures to implement sanctions decided by the UN, the OSCE, or by Switzerland's most significant trading partners. Each regime is a separate ordinance in the Classified Compilation. Nothing arrives automatically: adopting an EU package is a fresh Federal Council decision every time.

Embargo Act (EmbA) The lawSR 946.231, Art. 1–2
Ordinance on measures connected with the situation in Ukraine — a worked example of the pattern The lawSR 946.231.176.72

National emergency declared by Executive Order under IEEPA

The President declares a national emergency under the National Emergencies Act and invokes IEEPA to block property. The Executive Order creates the programme; OFAC issues the implementing regulations in 31 C.F.R. chapter V and adds names to the SDN List. Some programmes are additionally built on their own statutes.

Where they diverge

Speed is the practical difference. A US programme can be created by Executive Order overnight. An EU listing needs unanimity among 27 member states for the CFSP Decision before the Regulation can follow — which is why EU packages arrive in negotiated batches, and why the Swiss decision to match one comes later again.

2026-08-24 — checked against the official consolidated texts on un.org, EUR-Lex, legislation.gov.uk, Fedlex and uscode.house.gov.

02 · Who is actually bound by it?

Jurisdictional reach — the nexus test

The single largest source of error in this field. Each regime draws its net differently: one by territory, two by nationality plus territory, one by a combination that catches a payment merely for touching a US correspondent bank. A party can sit outside three regimes and squarely inside the fourth.

Binds states, not private parties

A UN measure creates an obligation on member states to give effect to it. No bank, company or individual is bound by the resolution as such; they are bound by whichever of the implementing regimes below reaches them. This is why the UN list and a national list rarely match exactly.

Charter of the United Nations The lawArt. 25 (obligation on members); Chapter VII, Art. 41

EU territory, EU nationals worldwide, EU-incorporated entities, and business done in the Union

The standard jurisdiction clause in an EU sanctions Regulation applies it within EU territory, on board aircraft and vessels under a member state's jurisdiction, to any national of a member state inside or outside EU territory, to any legal person incorporated or constituted under a member state's law, and to any legal person in respect of any business done in whole or in part within the Union. That last limb catches non-EU companies for their EU-facing business.

Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 — jurisdiction clause The lawArt. 13 (the clause is drafted in materially the same terms across EU sanctions Regulations)

Conduct in the UK, and UK persons wherever in the world they are

UK sanctions regulations reach conduct in the United Kingdom, and — expressly — conduct anywhere in the world by a UK person: a British national, or a body incorporated or constituted under the law of any part of the UK. A UK-incorporated subsidiary abroad carries the regime with it.

SAMLA 2018 — extra-territorial application The laws. 21
OFSI — UK financial sanctions guidance Regulator's guidance

Territorial — measures apply in Switzerland

Swiss sanctions ordinances apply within Switzerland, to persons and assets there. Switzerland does not run a general nationality-based extraterritorial rule of the EU or UK kind, so the practical question is whether the conduct, the assets or the institution are in Switzerland — not what passport the actor holds.

Embargo Act (EmbA) The lawSR 946.231 — scope; see also the scope article of each regime ordinance
SECO — sanctions and embargoes Regulator's guidance

US persons worldwide, anyone in the US — plus any transaction with a US nexus

"US person" covers US citizens and permanent residents wherever located, entities organised under US law including their foreign branches, and any person physically in the United States. Beyond that, a transaction is caught by its nexus: dollar payments clearing through a US correspondent bank, US-origin goods or technology, US-based servers, or a US person facilitating from abroad. Some programmes reach foreign subsidiaries of US companies as well.

31 C.F.R. chapter V — OFAC regulations The lawThe definition of "United States person" is set programme by programme; read the definitions subpart of the specific part
OFAC — sanctions programmes and country information Regulator's guidance

Where they diverge

Switzerland is territorial where the EU and UK are not: a Swiss ordinance reaches conduct in Switzerland, while an EU Regulation follows a member-state national anywhere in the world and a UK regulation follows a UK person anywhere in the world. So a UK national working in Zurich can be bound by UK sanctions on conduct that Swiss law does not reach at all — and vice versa. Assuming one screen answers for both is exactly the mistake.

2026-08-24 — jurisdiction clauses checked against the official consolidated texts; the EU clause read in Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014, the UK position in SAMLA 2018, the Swiss position in the Embargo Act, the US position in 31 C.F.R. ch. V.

03 · What is actually prohibited?

The freeze — and the second prohibition people miss

Practitioners think of sanctions as "don't pay the listed person". The freeze is only half of it. Every one of these regimes carries a separate and wider prohibition on making funds or economic resources available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of a designated person — which catches payments to third parties, goods, services and credit that never touch the designated party's own account.

Freeze and no-making-available, as an obligation on states

The standard UN asset-freeze formula requires states to freeze funds and economic resources of listed parties and to ensure that no funds are made available, directly or indirectly, to or for their benefit. It reaches a private party only through the implementing law.

Security Council sanctions committees Regulator's guidance

Freeze all funds and economic resources; make nothing available directly or indirectly

The two prohibitions sit side by side in the operative article of the asset-freeze Regulation: freeze everything belonging to, owned, held or controlled by a listed person, and make no funds or economic resources available to them or for their benefit. "Economic resources" is broad — assets of every kind that can be used to obtain funds, goods or services.

Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 The lawArt. 2(1) freeze; Art. 2(2) making available

Asset freeze, plus separate offences for making funds and economic resources available

UK regulations split the prohibitions across several regulations: the freeze itself, then distinct prohibitions on making funds available to a designated person, making funds available for their benefit, and the same pair again for economic resources. They are drafted separately because they are separately chargeable.

The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 The lawSI 2019/855, reg. 11 (freeze) and regs. 12–15 (making available)
OFSI — UK financial sanctions guidance Regulator's guidance

Freeze and no-making-available, set out in the regime ordinance

Each Swiss ordinance carries its own freeze article and its own prohibition on making funds and economic resources available to listed persons, drafted closely on the EU model where the ordinance implements an EU package. Read the ordinance for the regime in question — the articles are not numbered alike across ordinances.

Ordinance on measures connected with the situation in Ukraine The lawSR 946.231.176.72 — freeze and making-available articles

Property is blocked; all dealings prohibited — including facilitation

The US frames it as blocking: all property and interests in property of a designated person that come within the United States or within the possession or control of a US person are blocked, and virtually all transactions in that property are prohibited absent a licence. US persons are separately prohibited from approving, financing or otherwise facilitating a transaction by a foreign person that a US person could not do directly.

31 C.F.R. chapter V — OFAC regulations The lawBlocking and prohibited-transaction subparts of the relevant part
OFAC — frequently asked questions Regulator's guidance

Where they diverge

The structure is strikingly consistent across all four implementing regimes — freeze plus a making-available prohibition, both reaching indirect benefit. The US adds an express prohibition on facilitation by a US person, which is what catches an American compliance officer approving a transaction their non-US employer executes.

2026-08-24 — checked against Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014, SI 2019/855, the Swiss Ukraine ordinance (SR 946.231.176.72) and 31 C.F.R. ch. V.

04 · Is a company caught because of who owns it?

Ownership and control — the sharpest divergence of the five

Almost no sanctions problem is about a listed individual's own account. It is about a company that is not listed, owned or controlled by someone who is. Every regime extends to those companies — but by different tests, producing different answers on the same corporate structure.

Owned or controlled, directly or indirectly — applied by states

The UN freeze formula extends to funds owned or controlled directly or indirectly by listed persons, or by persons acting on their behalf or at their direction. How that is tested in practice is a matter for the implementing regime.

Security Council sanctions committees Regulator's guidance

Ownership above 50%, OR control on a separate set of indicators

The Council's Best Practices paper treats ownership as more than 50 percent of proprietary rights or a majority interest, and treats control as a separate question answered on indicators — the power to appoint or remove a majority of the board, to direct the company's affairs, or to use all or part of its assets. Either limb can bring an unlisted entity within the freeze.

EU Best Practices for the effective implementation of restrictive measures Regulator's guidanceCouncil doc. 10572/22 — the ownership and control section
Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 The lawArt. 2 — funds owned, held or controlled by listed persons

More than 50% of shares or voting rights, OR the ability to direct the company's affairs

The UK test is set out in the regulations themselves rather than left to guidance. A person owns or controls a body corporate if they hold more than 50 percent of the shares or voting rights, or can appoint or remove a majority of the board — or if it is reasonable to expect that they would be able to ensure the affairs of the body are conducted in accordance with their wishes. That last limb is deliberately wide.

The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 The lawSI 2019/855, reg. 7 — meaning of "owned or controlled directly or indirectly"
OFSI — UK financial sanctions guidance Regulator's guidance

Follows the ordinance — control tests drafted on the EU model where an EU package is adopted

Swiss ordinances reach funds and economic resources owned or controlled by listed persons, with the operative wording taken from the EU instrument where the ordinance implements an EU package. Because adoption is autonomous and ordinance-by-ordinance, the test is read from the specific ordinance rather than assumed from the EU text.

Ordinance on measures connected with the situation in Ukraine The lawSR 946.231.176.72
SECO — sanctions and embargoes Regulator's guidance

The 50 Percent Rule — aggregated, automatic, and with no control test in the rule

OFAC's published guidance: an entity owned 50 percent or more, directly or indirectly, in the aggregate by one or more blocked persons is itself blocked, whether or not OFAC has ever named it. The consequence is that the SDN List is not a complete list of blocked parties. OFAC separately warns that entities controlled but not majority-owned by blocked persons carry real risk and may themselves be designated — but that is a warning, not the rule.

OFAC — Entities Owned by Blocked Persons (the 50 Percent Rule) Regulator's guidanceOFAC's own published FAQ topic, restating the Revised Guidance of 13 August 2014
OFAC FAQ 398 — control without 50% ownership Regulator's guidance"OFAC's 50 Percent Rule speaks only to ownership and not to control"

Where they diverge

This is the divergence to memorise. The US rule is arithmetic and aggregating: 50 percent or more, directly or indirectly, held by one or more blocked persons **added together**, and the entity is blocked automatically whether or not it appears on any list — with no control test in the rule itself. The EU and UK tests are ownership **or** control, so a 30 percent holder who can direct the company's affairs can bring it in scope even though the arithmetic says no. Run a structure through both and you can get opposite answers: a company 25 percent owned by each of two blocked persons is blocked under the US aggregation rule; the same company may fall outside an EU or UK freeze unless control is made out.

2026-08-24 — checked against SI 2019/855 reg. 7, the Council's EU Best Practices paper, and OFAC's published 50 Percent Rule guidance.

05 · How does a permitted payment get through?

Licences, derogations and authorisations

A freeze is not a confiscation. Salaries, legal fees, insurance, humanitarian supplies and basic living costs move under licence. Where you apply — and to how many authorities — is a structural fact about the regime, and it is where the EU's decentralisation bites hardest.

Exemptions granted or notified through the Sanctions Committee

The UN framework provides for exemptions — basic expenses, extraordinary expenses, judgments and liens — operated through notification to or approval by the relevant Committee, and given effect through national procedures.

Security Council sanctions committees Regulator's guidance

Derogations granted by the competent authority of each member state

The Regulation itself sets out the derogation grounds; the decision is taken by the national competent authority, whose contact details are annexed to the Regulation. There is no EU-wide general licence of the UK or US kind, and practice between authorities is not uniform.

Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 — derogation articles and the annex of competent authorities The law
EU Best Practices for the effective implementation of restrictive measures Regulator's guidanceCouncil doc. 10572/22

OFSI general licences and specific licences, on statutory grounds

OFSI issues general licences that any person meeting the stated conditions may use without applying, subject to reporting and record-keeping conditions, and grants specific licences on application. The permissible grounds are set out in the schedule to the relevant regulations.

OFSI — financial sanctions general licences Regulator's guidance
OFSI — how to apply for a financial sanctions licence Regulator's guidance
The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 The lawSI 2019/855, Part 7 and the licensing schedule

SECO authorisations under the relevant ordinance

Each ordinance names SECO as the authority that may authorise payments and releases on stated grounds, in consultation with the other federal offices concerned. Applications go to SECO directly.

Ordinance on measures connected with the situation in Ukraine The lawSR 946.231.176.72 — authorisation articles
SECO — sanctions and embargoes Regulator's guidance

OFAC general licences (self-executing) and specific licences on application

General licences are published in the regulations or issued as standalone authorisations and authorise a described class of transaction without application. Anything outside one requires a specific licence applied for through OFAC's licensing portal. Both are read strictly — a general licence authorises what it says and no more.

31 C.F.R. chapter V — licensing subparts The law
OFAC — sanctions programmes and country information (general licences by programme) Regulator's guidance

Where they diverge

One counter, or twenty-seven. The UK and the US each have a single licensing authority with published general licences that anyone meeting the conditions can rely on without applying. The EU has no central licensing body at all: derogations are granted by the competent authority of the relevant member state, listed in the annex to each Regulation, so the same transaction may need a different authority — and can meet a different answer — depending on where the funds sit.

2026-08-24 — checked against SAMLA 2018 and OFSI's published licensing guidance, the derogation articles of Regulation (EU) No 269/2014, the Swiss ordinance authorisation articles, and 31 C.F.R. ch. V.

06 · Who has to tell the authorities, and when?

Reporting duties

The freeze is a prohibition; the report is a positive duty, and it is the one firms breach without ever making a payment. Sitting on a frozen account and not reporting it is its own offence in more than one of these regimes.

State-level implementation reporting

Reporting under the UN framework runs between states and the Committees. Private-sector duties are created by the implementing regime.

Security Council sanctions committees Regulator's guidance

Duty on any person to supply information to the competent authority

The Regulation requires natural and legal persons to supply immediately to the competent authority of the member state where they reside or are located any information that would facilitate compliance — including accounts and amounts frozen — and to cooperate in verifying it. It is not limited to regulated firms.

Council Regulation (EU) No 269/2014 The lawArt. 8 — information duties

Relevant firms must inform OFSI as soon as practicable

A relevant firm that knows or has reasonable cause to suspect that a person is a designated person, or has committed a financial-sanctions offence, must inform OFSI as soon as practicable, stating the information on which the knowledge or suspicion is based and any frozen holdings. Failure to report is itself an offence.

The Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 The lawSI 2019/855, Part 7 — information and reporting
OFSI — reporting information to OFSI: what to do Regulator's guidance

Report frozen assets to SECO without delay

Persons and institutions holding or managing assets covered by a freeze must report them to SECO immediately, and the Embargo Act carries a general duty to provide the supervisory authorities with the information and documents they need. The reporting article sits in each ordinance.

Embargo Act (EmbA) The lawSR 946.231 — duty to provide information
Ordinance on measures connected with the situation in Ukraine The lawSR 946.231.176.72 — reporting article

Prompt reports of blocked and rejected transactions, plus an annual return

Holders of blocked property report to OFAC when property is first blocked and when a transaction is rejected, and file an annual report of blocked property held. The reporting, procedures and penalties regulations set out the form and timing.

31 C.F.R. part 501 — Reporting, Procedures and Penalties Regulations The law

Where they diverge

The UK's duty is narrower in who it binds but sharper in what it demands: it falls on "relevant firms" — financial institutions and other regulated businesses — and bites as soon as the firm knows or has reasonable cause to suspect, whether or not it holds anything. The EU duty under the Regulation falls on any person, entity or body, and the US reporting obligation is an annual return of blocked property plus prompt reporting when property is first blocked or a transaction rejected.

2026-08-24 — checked against the information provisions of SI 2019/855 and OFSI guidance, Art. 8 of Regulation (EU) No 269/2014, the Embargo Act reporting article, and 31 C.F.R. ch. V.

07 · What happens if it goes wrong?

Enforcement standard and penalties

The mental state required for liability is the difference between a defensible mistake and an unavoidable penalty. Two of these regimes will penalise a firm that did not know and had no reason to suspect. That changes what a compliance programme is for.

No direct enforcement against private parties

The Security Council monitors state implementation through its Committees and panels of experts. Penalties against a firm come from national law.

Security Council sanctions committees Regulator's guidance

Penalties set by each member state; a harmonised criminal floor since 2024

EU Regulations require member states to lay down effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties, which historically produced wide variation. Directive (EU) 2024/1226 defines the criminal offences and penalty levels member states must provide for violations of Union restrictive measures, and set a transposition deadline for national law.

Directive (EU) 2024/1226 on the definition of criminal offences and penalties for the violation of Union restrictive measures The law

OFSI monetary penalties on a strict-liability basis, plus criminal offences

OFSI may impose a civil monetary penalty where it is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that a prohibition was breached. The Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022 removed the requirement that the firm knew or had reasonable cause to suspect, with effect from 15 June 2022. Breaches are separately criminal offences under the regulations, prosecuted to the criminal standard.

Policing and Crime Act 2017 — monetary penalties for breaches of financial sanctions The lawPart 8
Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022 The lawThe amendment removing the knowledge/reasonable-cause test
OFSI — enforcement and monetary penalties for breaches of financial sanctions Regulator's guidance

Criminal liability under the Embargo Act

The Embargo Act makes wilful violation of a sanctions ordinance an offence, with a lesser penalty for negligence, and provides for prosecution under Swiss administrative criminal procedure. Enforcement runs through SECO and the federal department concerned rather than a civil penalty regime of the OFSI kind.

Embargo Act (EmbA) The lawSR 946.231 — penal provisions

Strict-liability civil penalties; criminal liability for wilful violations

IEEPA provides civil penalties that OFAC may impose without proof of intent, and criminal penalties for wilful violations. OFAC's published enforcement guidelines set out the aggravating and mitigating factors, and the base-penalty structure that makes voluntary self-disclosure and a functioning compliance programme worth real money.

IEEPA — penalties (U.S. Code, GPO) The law50 U.S.C. § 1705
31 C.F.R. part 501, Appendix A — Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines The law
OFAC — civil penalties and enforcement Regulator's guidance

Where they diverge

Strict liability is the headline. Since 15 June 2022 OFSI may impose a monetary penalty without needing to show that the firm knew or had reasonable cause to suspect it was breaching a prohibition; the US civil penalty regime under IEEPA has long operated on the same strict basis, with criminal liability reserved for wilful violations. The EU, by contrast, had no harmonised criminal standard at all until Directive (EU) 2024/1226 required member states to criminalise defined violations — so historic EU enforcement variation between member states is a feature of the old architecture, not an anomaly.

2026-08-24 — checked against the Policing and Crime Act 2017 as amended by the Economic Crime (Transparency and Enforcement) Act 2022, Directive (EU) 2024/1226, the Embargo Act penal provisions, and IEEPA.

08 · Why do the four lists never quite agree?

Transposition, divergence, and the conflict the Blocking Statute creates

A designation does not appear everywhere at once, and sometimes never appears at all. The gaps are structural, not administrative — and in one case two regimes give directly contradictory instructions, so complying with both is impossible by design.

The apex — and the source of the de-listing problem

Most EU, UK and Swiss designations in the counter-terrorism and country regimes originate in a UN listing. Because the listing decision is taken by a political body, challenge routes were built afterwards: a Focal Point for de-listing requests, and an Ombudsperson for the ISIL/Al-Qaida list.

UN Security Council — de-listing and the Focal Point Regulator's guidance
Office of the Ombudsperson (ISIL/Da'esh and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee) Regulator's guidance

Implements UN listings — but subject to fundamental-rights review, and blocks certain US measures

The Court of Justice held in Kadi that an EU regulation implementing a UN listing remains subject to review for compliance with fundamental rights under EU law: the UN origin of a listing does not immunise the EU act. Separately, the Blocking Statute prohibits EU operators from complying with the specified US extraterritorial measures listed in its annex.

Kadi and Al Barakaat, Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P JudgmentJudgment of 3 September 2008
Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 — the Blocking Statute The law

Autonomous since Brexit — retained regimes now diverge from the EU's

UK regimes were carried over as EU-exit statutory instruments and have been amended independently since. The UK list and the EU list overlap heavily but are not the same list, and designations, delistings and licence positions move on separate timetables. Screening against one does not discharge the other.

Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 The law
The UK Sanctions List (UKSL) Finding aid — not the law
Moving to a single list for UK sanctions designations, 28 January 2026 Regulator's guidanceFCDO/HMT/OFSI — the OFSI Consolidated List is no longer updated

Adopts EU packages by autonomous decision — which can mean a lag, and can mean differences

Switzerland implements UN measures as a UN member; EU measures reach Swiss law only when the Federal Council decides to adopt them, package by package. The decision is Switzerland's own, so the timing and occasionally the content differ from the EU instrument being mirrored. Read the ordinance, never the EU regulation it resembles.

Embargo Act (EmbA) The lawSR 946.231, Art. 1 — the sanctions Switzerland may implement
SECO — sanctions and embargoes Regulator's guidance

Secondary sanctions — designating non-US parties with no US nexus at all

Beyond the primary regime, several US programmes provide for designating a non-US person for engaging in significant transactions with sanctioned parties. No US touchpoint is required. The practical effect on a European bank is that the decisive question is not only "am I a US person" but "what does dealing here cost me in access to the dollar system" — which is why US measures shape behaviour well outside US jurisdiction.

OFAC — sanctions programmes and country information Regulator's guidanceSecondary-sanctions authorities are programme-specific; read the authority for the programme in question
31 C.F.R. chapter V — OFAC regulations The law

Where they diverge

The EU Blocking Statute is the case where the regimes do not merely differ but conflict: it prohibits EU operators from complying with the listed US extraterritorial measures, so an EU subsidiary of a US group can face a US penalty for acting and an EU penalty for not acting. Anyone advising across the corridor needs to know it exists before it is discovered the hard way.

2026-08-24 — checked against Regulation (EC) No 2271/96, the Kadi judgment (Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P), and the UN de-listing procedures.

Related surfaces:

The walkthrough The exercises Regulatory Watch The Atlas Glossary