Regulatory analysis · Switzerland
Switzerland proposed two new financial-institution licences in October 2025 — one for payment institutions, one for crypto institutions. The consultation closed on 6 February 2026. Six and a half months later nothing has been published: no results report, no dispatch, no parliamentary file.
Below: what the draft actually does, what the consultation said back, and why the numbers that decide whether either licence is usable do not yet exist.
Quotations are from the German consultation texts. English renderings are this practice's own working translation; the German carries the citation.
The silence is the news
The Federal Council opened the consultation on 22 October 2025. The general deadline was 6 February 2026.
As at 23 August 2026:
| Expected step | Status |
|---|---|
| Ergebnisbericht on the consultation | Not published |
| Botschaft (dispatch) to Parliament | Not adopted |
| Curia Vista business object | None — and a dispatch cannot reach Parliament without one |
The only forward-looking statement traced is in the State Secretariat for International Financial Matters fact sheet of 22 October 2025: "Frühestens im zweiten Halbjahr 2026 wird der Bundesrat dem Parlament eine Botschaft zur Genehmigung unterbreiten" — a dispatch at the earliest in the second half of 2026. That window is closing, and it has been neither reaffirmed nor withdrawn.
Entry into force on 1 January 2027, the date circulating in practitioner commentary since last autumn, is not reachable on ordinary legislative mechanics. Firms planning against it should stop.
What the draft creates
Two new categories are inserted into the Federal Act on Financial Institutions of 15 June 2018 (FinIA/FINIG), alongside the existing ones in Art. 2(1).
| Category | Articles | Definition |
|---|---|---|
| Payment institution (Zahlungsmittelinstitut) | Draft Arts 51a–51q | Primarily active in the financial sector; without a banking licence, commercially accepts client funds or publicly solicits them; pays no interest on them; invests them only as Art. 51i permits |
| Crypto institution (Krypto-Institut) | Draft Arts 51r–51zter | Custody of stablecoins or crypto-assets with trading character; dealing in own name for clients' account; short-term own-account dealing with public price quotation continuously or on request |
The crypto-institution section runs past Art. 51z to Art. 51zbis (group supervision) and Art. 51zter (a record-keeping duty covering all orders and transactions, breach of which is a criminal offence under draft Art. 71(a)). Anyone reading the section as ending at 51z misses both.
A crypto institution may not conduct uncovered transactions in crypto-assets with trading character (draft Art. 51r(2)). It may offer staking, but only if it is already a custodian, and only on terms agreed in advance in an agreement separate from its general conditions — in writing or in another form demonstrable by text (draft Art. 51z).
Banks and securities firms get the crypto-institution permission automatically: draft Art. 6 makes a banking licence, and a securities-house licence under Art. 41(a), carry authorisation to operate as a crypto institution. There is no such cascade for payment institutions — the root of the objection discussed below.
The fintech licence is repealed outright
The Annex repeals Art. 1b of the Federal Act on Banks and Savings Banks of 8 November 1934 (the Banking Act) — the fintech licence — with a single word: Aufgehoben.
The explanatory report is candid about why it failed. The reasons it records are the insufficient protection of client funds in bankruptcy ("der ungenügende Schutz der Kundengelder im Konkursfall dem Erfolg dieser Bewilligungskategorie abträglich sei"), the inability to invest the funds or pay interest — which confined licence-holders to payment services — the difficulty of describing what they offer without saying "banking services", the CHF 100m cap, and a slow authorisation procedure.
The report's own impact assessment puts the affected population at four undertakings primarily active as payment service providers as at August 2025, three holding public deposits of between CHF 1m and 20m and the fourth over CHF 50m. Six firms hold an Art. 1b licence on FINMA's list as at 23 August 2026.
The payment-institution licence is the replacement, and the central fix is that client funds become segregable in insolvency under draft Art. 51q.
Segregation is not deposit protection
It would be easy to read that fix as giving stablecoinA token designed to track a currency, run by an issuer who can typically freeze balances — e.g. USDT or USDC. and payment customers what bank depositors have. The report says the opposite, repeatedly and deliberately:
"Der Begriff der Kundengelder unterscheidet sich vom Begriff der Publikumseinlagen, da für Erstere nicht das Konzept der privilegierten Einlagen gemäss Artikel 37a BankG und der Einlagensicherung gemäss Artikel 37h BankG gilt, sondern diese Kundengelder bei den Zahlungsmittelinstituten im Konkursfalle abgesondert werden … Sie stellen also wesensgemäss gerade keine Publikumseinlagen dar."
Client funds are not public deposits. They carry no privileged-deposit status under Art. 37a of the Banking Act and no deposit insurance under Art. 37h. They are segregated from the estate instead.
The two mechanisms differ in both directions. A bank customer has no segregation right in a bank insolvency; they have a privileged claim and insurance capped at CHF 100,000. A payment-institution customer has segregation, which is not capped — but which runs only against the payment institution itself. The report is explicit that there is "kein Absonderungsrecht direkt gegen die Bank" where the institution has placed the funds.
Better in some respects, worse in others, and not equivalent in any.
The provision that will decide most disputes
New Art. 8a of the Federal Act on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing in the Financial Sector of 10 October 1997 (AMLA) applies to payment institutions issuing a stablecoinA token designed to track a currency, run by an issuer who can typically freeze balances — e.g. USDT or USDC.. It requires them to assess and monitor secondary-market risk before issuance, and offers two illustrative routes — "können sie insbesondere auf eine der folgenden Arten erfüllen", so safe harbours rather than an exhaustive choice:
- maintain a list of wallets from and to which transactions are excluded, with criteria for entry and removal; or
- ensure that all holders on the secondary market are identified, that identification being carried out by financial intermediaries subject to regulation and supervision equivalent to Switzerland's.
Then, whatever route is taken, Art. 8a(4) requires the issuer to be able in any case ("in jedem Fall") to block a transaction in an individual token on the secondary market, freeze an individual token, and recall an individual token. The measures must be described in the whitepaper.
Read that against an open ledger. The issuer must retain a technical capability to reach into a secondary market it does not operate and act on a single unit held by a party it has no relationship with. That is an engineering requirement, not a compliance one.
What the draft does to FINMA Guidance 06/2024
Here the direction of travel is the reverse of what most commentary assumes.
The explanatory report cross-refers expressly to FINMA Guidance 06/2024 — three times — and identifies mandatory whitelisting with FINMA's current practice:
"Eine in jedem Fall bestehende Pflicht, dass vor Erhalt des wertstabilen kryptobasierten Zahlungsmittels jede Halterin und jeder Halter durch ein dem GwG unterstellten Finanzintermediär identifiziert wird (sog. Whitelisting) … Dies entspricht der Praxis der FINMA gemäss Aufsichtsmitteilung 06/2024."
And then rejects it, as "im internationalen Vergleich besonders restriktiv" and potentially prohibitive. The conclusion is unambiguous: "Ein Whitelisting wird nicht vorgeschrieben, aber als mögliche Alternative zur Erfüllung der gesetzlichen Anforderungen zugelassen."
So the draft softens FINMA's supervisory practice on identification, demoting mandatory whitelisting to one of two optional routes — while hardening the position on control, by making block, freeze and recall capability unconditional. Issuers gain flexibility on who they must identify and lose it entirely on what they must be able to do to a token in the wild.
Where the numbers are not
Neither licence has a price.
Minimum capital for payment institutions (draft Art. 51e) and for crypto institutions (draft Art. 51v) is set in identical terms: "Der Bundesrat regelt die Höhe des Mindestkapitals." Own funds under draft Arts 51f and 51w are likewise delegated, to be set by business activity and risk.
The explanatory report describes the intended design without giving figures. Own funds for payment institutions are to be progressive by reference to client funds held:
"Konkret werden verschiedene Stufen definiert, innerhalb derer jeweils ein bestimmter Eigenmittelprozentsatz angewendet wird. Übersteigen die entgegengenommenen Kundengelder die Grenze zur nächsthöheren Stufe, wird der höhere Prozentsatz auf den Betrag angewendet, der über die vorherige Stufe hinausgeht."
Tiered, and applied marginally — in the manner of income-tax bands. The report records that linear own-funds requirements were considered and rejected, on the reasoning that they would burden institutions equally regardless of size or risk structure and so constrain small and medium undertakings disproportionately: "Folglich fand diese Alternative keine weitere Berücksichtigung."
Three consequences, and they compound. No one can price the licence — which is precisely the economic-viability objection several respondents made. The progressive requirements attacked in the consultation are a feature of the report's intended ordinance, not of the draft statute, so there is no binding text to argue with yet. And because the amounts sit at ordinance level, they can be set — and later changed — without returning to Parliament.
The transition is shorter than MiCA's, and open-ended
Draft Art. 74b sets the terms, and they are widely misread.
Firms already holding an authorisation under a financial market act for the corresponding activity — the six Art. 1b holders among them — need no new authorisation ("bedürfen keiner neuen Bewilligung"). They must meet the new requirements within one year. They comply; they do not apply.
Firms not previously subject to authorisation must apply within one year. Until FINMA decides, they "may continue their activities provided they are affiliated with a self-regulatory organisation under the AMLA and are supervised by it".
Set against the EU that is a genuine contrast, though not the simple one usually drawn. Art. 143(3) of Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 on markets in crypto-assets (MiCA) lets crypto-asset service providers already operating before 30 December 2024 continue until 1 July 2026 or until authorisation is granted or refused, whichever comes first — up to eighteen months, but Member States may shorten it, and per the European Securities and Markets Authority's published list several did, to as little as six.
So: Switzerland's window is shorter but open-ended; MiCA's is longer but hard-stopped. A Swiss firm keeps trading until FINMA decides. An EU firm stopped on 1 July 2026 whether its regulator had decided or not.
That also makes the self-regulatory organisations the bridge rather than merely the thing being replaced. They carry supervision of the migrating population for however long FINMA takes.
What came back
Six criticisms recur across the submissions this practice has retrieved, and several cut across the bank/crypto divide, which makes them the likeliest to move.
The forced subsidiary for bank stablecoin issuance. The most widely opposed feature. The Swiss Bankers Association calls it "systemwidrig, unverhältnismässig, wettbewerbsverzerrend" — contrary to the system, disproportionate, competition-distorting — and adds that it "bietet keinen zusätzlichen Kunden- oder Systemschutz". The Swiss Blockchain Federation reaches the same conclusion from the opposite side of the market. So does the Canton of Zurich, independently, asking that payment institutions be brought inside the Art. 6 authorisation cascade.
Progressive capital. The SBA calls it "unnötig prohibitiv und innovationshemmend". Zurich objects on the ground that payment institutions are barred from active business, so "beschränkt sich das Risikoprofil auf operationelle Risiken". Neither engages with the report's stated reasoning for rejecting a linear model.
The definition of "crypto-assets with trading character". Attacked as incoherent by the Swiss People's Party (SVP), the Swiss Fintech Association and Zurich. The SFTA's worked examples are the sharpest: "SOL (ein Utility Token mit Marktkapitalisierung von über CHF 100 Mia.) kann ohne Lizenz und mit Eigenmitteln vermischt aufbewahrt werden, ein wertloses Kunst-NFT nicht einmal segregiert"; and gold may be stored without a licence, while a token representing title to it needs one.
Wallet whitelisting. The SVP writes that a "Swiss finish" of this kind "würde DeFi-Anwendungen in der Schweiz praktisch verunmöglichen und Innovation ins Ausland verdrängen" — would make DeFi applications practically impossible in Switzerland and drive innovation abroad. Its own counter-proposal is risk-based, using transaction monitoring and chain analytics as equivalent mitigation. The SFTA and the SBF propose blacklisting instead — which is, in substance, the first of the two routes Art. 8a(3) already offers.
The multi-issuance prohibition. The SBA and Zurich want it deleted; the SFTA wants it conditioned rather than absolute.
FINMA process. Slow, opaque, unpredictable. The SBF asks that licensing decisions normally be completed within six months of a complete application. Some version of this appears in almost every industry submission.
MiCA, and where the comparison actually sits
It is widely said that the proposal does not engage with MiCA. On the published summaries that is fair: the Federal Council's press release speaks only of implementing international standards, and the SIF fact sheet refers generically to the EU, the UK, the United States and Singapore.
The explanatory report tells a different story. Its section 2 is headed "Rechtsvergleich, insbesondere mit dem europäischen Recht", and MiCA appears thirty-four times in the report, thirty-two of them in that section. It works through asset-referenced tokens, e-money tokens and crypto-asset service providers, and notes the ESMA public statement on services in relation to non-MiCA-compliant tokens, citing USDT as the example.
It also records where the Swiss approach departs. Unlike MiCA, executing client orders in stablecoinsA token designed to track a currency, run by an issuer who can typically freeze balances — e.g. USDT or USDC. requires no special authorisation, "da diese kryptobasierten Vermögenswerte als Zahlungsmittel konzipiert sind" — because they are conceived as means of payment. And unlike EU law, the new crypto-institution licence does not cover portfolio-management services.
The comparison exists. It sits in 111 pages of German that the public debate proceeded without.
That gap had a consequence. Respondents supplied their own MiCA comparison and used it against the draft — the SBA citing Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 by number to argue that EU credit institutions may issue e-money tokens directly, without a separate entity, and that a "Schweizer Sonderlösung" would weaken the location and disadvantage banks in Switzerland. Banks invoking the EU as the liberal benchmark against a Swiss proposal is a reversal of the usual framing, and it is the most quotable feature of the response.
For the practitioner
Do not plan against 1 January 2027. No dispatch exists. On the DLT Act's pace — dispatch November 2019, final vote September 2020, in force August 2021 — 2028 is the earliest. On this file's own precedent, the FinSA/FinIA package took roughly four years from dispatch to entry into force, which points to 2029.
The licence cost is an ordinance question, not a statutory one. Anyone modelling whether either licence is viable is modelling an unknown, and will still be doing so after Parliament finishes. Watch the ordinance consultation, not the Act.
If you hold an Art. 1b fintech licence, you do not reapply. Draft Art. 74b(1) carries the authorisation across; the obligation is to meet the new requirements within one year of entry into force. If you are SRO-affiliated and newly caught, apply within one year and keep the affiliation live — it is the condition of continuing to trade while FINMA decides.
Do not tell a payment customer they have deposit protection. Segregation under draft Art. 51q is a different mechanism from the privileged deposits and CHF 100,000 insurance of Arts 37a and 37h of the Banking Act, and it does not reach the bank holding the funds.
One thing this practice could not establish, and will not guess. No consultation response from any Swiss self-regulatory organisation — VQF, PolyReg, ARIF, SO-FIT or Forum SRO — could be located. That is unlikely to mean they were silent: their members are the population most directly affected, and migration to FINMA licensing is an existential question for them. The likelier explanation is that they filed without self-publishing, and the Fedlex submission register could not be read. The only proxies are Zurich questioning exclusive FINMA supervision and suggesting dual oversight, and the SBF asking for two-tier supervision with SROs retained for smaller institutions. Neither is an SRO speaking, and no characterisation of the SRO position is offered here.
Key takeaways
- Two new FinIA licence categories: payment institutions (draft Arts 51a–51q) and crypto institutions (draft Arts 51r–51zter). Art. 1b of the Banking Act is repealed outright.
- The consultation closed on 6 February 2026 and nothing has been published since — no results report, no dispatch, no parliamentary file.
- Minimum capital and own funds are delegated entirely to the Federal Council. The licence cannot be priced from the statute, and the figures can change after Parliament finishes.
- Draft Art. 8a AMLA relaxes FINMA Guidance 06/2024 by making whitelisting optional, and tightens control by requiring block, freeze and recall capability over individual tokens in any case.
- Segregation of client funds is not deposit protection. It is uncapped where insurance is capped, and it does not run against the bank holding the funds.
Sources
Consultation package (held in full; the German originals carry the citation)
- Federal Council, opening of the consultation, 22 October 2025
- Draft Act — Bundesgesetz über die Finanzinstitute (FINIG), Änderung vom … (Vernehmlassungsentwurf)
- Explanatory report — Erläuternder Bericht zur Änderung des Finanzinstitutsgesetzes, 111 pp, §1.1.2, §1.2.4, §2 Rechtsvergleich, insbesondere mit dem europäischen Recht, §5.4.1
- Vergleich mit geltendem Recht (synopsis); cantonal and organisation covering letters; addressee list
- SIF dossier — DLT and blockchain
Consultation responses
- Schweizerische Bankiervereinigung, 11 February 2026 (filed within an extension granted to it; the general deadline was not extended)
- Swiss Blockchain Federation, published 8 December 2025
- Swiss Fintech Association, 6 February 2026
- SVP, 6 February 2026
- Canton of Zurich, RRB 2026-0099, 28 January 2026
- Sozialdemokratische Partei, February 2026
- VSV/ASG, 6 February 2026
Related
- Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 (MiCA) — Art. 143(3) transitional provisions
- FINMA — recognised self-regulatory organisations
- FINMA — authorised institutions, individuals and products
Research and analysis, not legal advice · the draft is a consultation text and may change · positions stated as at 23 August 2026 · English renderings of the German consultation texts are this practice's own working translation and are unofficial.